E-Mail service

P. Bateman said:
Which secure E-Mail service should I go with?
Click to expand...


Well, Mirrorshades is the one you really want to ask as his is the last word in my mind on this, but all I can do is repeat a little of what he has shared with me.

Most, so called secure emails are not secure at all and it all has to do with the way they are encrypted. Safe-mail, securenym, and anonspeach all fall into this category. The best things these places may have going for them is if they do not cooperate with the US.

He would also tell you that if you encrypt your emails using a PGP key than you could use any email and the DOD could never open it, but they would know it's you and because they are all tied to your IP addy.

So, the safer way would be to have an email account that masks your IP, such as Tormail. Yes, it primitive and slow, but your IP is always changing and no one can ever trace it to your living room, plus it's free! The if you were to add PGP encryption your solid.

I am using my Tor browser and have let my sources know I use tor and I feel very safe. Heck my browser says I am am in the Netherlands right now.

https://check.torproject.org/?lang=en-US&small=1&uptodate=0

Hawk
 
I use safe-mail as well but hear they aer run by the Israeli Massad. Not sure if it's true or not. But it's worked for me for a while now.
 
I sign up to countermail and as soon as I'm due to pay (1 month late) I drop it and sign up with another account. This way I get a good encrypted email account for free...only downside is you need to change email addy every month.
 
I still have a safe-mail account from some time back, BUT the major problem with it is that securnym accounts will not let safe-mail through. So either go with securnym or anonymousspeech.

Hawk
 
P. Bateman said:
Which secure E-Mail service should I go with?
Click to expand...

First, I'll give you the short answer -- none of the commercial ones.

Now for the long answer.

What I would consider "secure" and what they consider "secure" are two entirely different things. You have to bear in mind that the commercial providers of "secure" emails have two goals in mind:

1) To stay in business; and

2) To (hopefully) make a profit.

Having their servers seized, and their business shut-down by the authorities, tends to prevent them from achieving goals 1) and 2).

Accordingly, almost all commercial services include language in their terms of service that prohibit illegal activities. (If they failed to do so, they potentially risk legal liability as accessories after the fact, if nothing else.) How far the services go, when suspected illegal activity comes to their attention differs widely. Some services merely shut-down accounts; others, like Hushmail, not only shut-down accounts, but they allegedly report suspected illegal activities to the RCMP/Interpol.

One thing common to almost all these service providers is that, when approached by the authorities with a warrant, they will roll-over on their users, no ifs, no ands, no buts.

Some, like Securenym, claim to vigorously fight any subpoenas they are presented with -- whether this is true or not I cannot say. My limited understanding of American law is that subpoenas can be challenged in court, whereas search warrants cannot. In any case, such challenges are expensive to mount, and most providers do not have the resources or deep pockets of a company like Google.

Even then, they can still lose. Twitter is just such a case in point. Twitter went to bat for 3 of its users caught-up in the Wikileaks investigation -- they fought the U.S. government subpoenas in the courts for 18 months, and still lost at the court of appeal.

So, at some point, they're going to cooperate with the authorities -- whether they do it voluntarily, or they are compelled to do so by the courts. None of this should come as no surprise whatsoever -- after all, they want to stay in business, and keep themselves out of jail.

So, we've established that they're going to cooperate with the authorities. What form will that cooperation take?

In general, you have to consider that they're going to hand over everything they have on you.: lock, stock, and barrel.

Usually that means:

1) Credit card number (in the case of a paid service)

Now, some services (like Securenym, and possibly others) claim to take steps to prevent association of your credit card number with any particular account. Needless to say, this is impossible to verify. What is fairly clear, however, is that there has to be some association between an email account and your credit card number for at least a period of time. If this wer not the case, then how would these companies handle charge- backs from the credit card companies?

2) IP addresses used to both setup/access the account

Harvesting of IP addresses is depressingly common. Even in the absence of other identifying information (e.g. credit card) your IP address, is enough to ascertain your ISP, Given the dates/times of your logins, your ISP can narrow down which of their customers was assigned that IP address at those particular dates and times. Your ISP will hand over your name, address, telephone number, etc.

3) Encryption keys (if any)

To the best of my knowledge, almost all or the services currently in existence, e.g. Hushmail, Safe-Mail, Anonymousspeech, Countermail, etc. all generate and store the encryption keys for you. If your "secure" email provider generates/stores the encryption keys, they can also capture your passphrase, if compelled to. With your private key, and your passphrase, they can decrypt all your email. This is what happened in the case of Tyler Stumbo and Hushmail.

4) Passphrase

This can be captured, if need be, to decrypt your emails.

5) Copies of stored emails, if any

6) Addresses stored in your address book.

Quite a haul, by any reckoning, isn't it?

I'm sure you would agree this has been a truly depressing read. The question is, what can be done about it? The answer is: quite a lot, actually.

It all depends how much you value your safety/freedom. Let me be blunt -- you can't buy safety from the authorities. Anyone who tells you that you can, is trying to scam you.

If you're willing to invest some time and effort, however, you can learn to use freely-available tools which will provide you with even better email security than many police forces themselves have. (I've gone through some of the various police emails as published by Anonymous, and I've been amused at just how woefully bad some of their security is. If you follow my instructions, you'll be far better off.)

As Hawk has already intimated, I'm currently advising that people use TorMail for an email account. While TorMail does not encrypt the email, it nevertheless is anonymous.

In an ideal world, you want both anonymity and encryption; if you can't have both, you want anonymity, more than encryption. Why?

Simple. If you're anonymous, you can't be raided by the authorities. TorMail is operated as a Tor hidden service -- this means that it can only be accessed by using the Tor anonymizing network. Why is this important?

1) Because you have to be running Tor to access TorMail, your real IP address is never exposed. The Tormail operators don't ask for any information other than email username and a password. There is nothing to link your TorMail address to your real ISP, or identity.

2) Because TorMail is operated as a Tor hidden service, the authorities have no idea where the server(s) are located, nor do they have any idea who the operators are. Accordingly, they can't find the servers to raid them; similarly, they can't locate the operators to put pressure on them.

So, how do you sign-up for a TorMail account?

First, you have to download and run the Tor Browser Bundle.

Go to the Tor homepage: https://www.torproject.org/

Click on the purple button that says, "Download Tor"

Choose the Tor Browser Bundle for your Operating System -- it is available for Windows, Mac and Linux.

Download the installer file to a folder. After the download is finished, run the executable to extract the files. One of the files will be an executable that will start Tor, and Aurora, a slightly stripped-down version of Firefox.

The browser will take you to the Torproject's page that will verify that Tor is running, and show you your IP address. This IP address will not be the same one as assigned to you by your ISP.

Next, you'll want to head over to the TorMail project homepage:
http://jhiwjjlqpyawmpjx.onion/

You'll notice that the address is not a regular address -- the .onion is a pseudo-top-level domain, accessible only through Tor.

Once you go there, just click on the link to setup an account, and you'll be asked for a username, password, and to solve a captcha. Your account will be ready to use in about 5 minutes.

When you go to login, I would use the Squirrelmail interface; although the site operators recommend RoundCube, RoundCube uses Java, and I see that as a security risk.

Here is a direct link to the Squirrelmail login:

http://jhiwjjlqpyawmpjx.onion/squirrelmail/src/login.php

Have fun!

Mirrorshades
 
Last edited:
Some further thoughts on TorMail

Some further thoughts on TorMail

I just wanted to re-iterate a couple of points...

When you communicate securely, you want to have two things:

1) To be anonymous; and

2) To have privacy.

Privacy and anonymity are NOT the same thing. Using TorMail, one is anonymous, but not private. The reason I say that, is because the admins of the TorMail service could, if they so chose, read (and copy) your email.

They could also access your address book, and see who you were writing to, and what you were writing about.

Now, mind, I'm NOT knocking the TorMail admins for this -- this is true of every email provider in existence today. Any admin can snoop on your email, if they are so inclined.

The way to stop that is to use encryption. If you use a nymserver, you can have all (incoming) email sent to you automatically encrypted. The authorities cannot decrypt your mail, because (unlike Hushmail and its various clones) only YOU have the private half of the key which is needed to decrypt the messages.

The nymserver also anonymizes the incoming email, so even the TorMail admins can't determine who sent you any email. Likewise, the Subject: lines can be encrypted, so they can't even learn anything about the email from the Subject: line.

When you decrypt the email, you'll be able to see the original, exactly as it was sent, with all the headers and all the other information intact.

I'm going to elaborate at this over the next couple of weeks -- I've been planning to give a tutorial on the use of encryption and nymservers for some time now, and I'm just about ready to proceed.

Although on the surface, it may appear complicated enough to make your head explode, you can make use of these tools if you can follow step by step instructions.

Mirrorshades
 
Sounds like mirrorshades got this covered. Damn, that's some intense stuff. Thanks for the info.

I think if you are going to just need it for random use here and there...a place like 4seruremail is decent. A paid place is always going to be better than a non paid email that is suppose to be secure. If you need to be really secure than, mirrorshades got it down.
 
Tyler Stumbo was that kid from Osaca labs IIRC, was caught in ORD.

Great post MS, i'm going to share this at a few boards, it's great info to have on hand and use.
 
MS, i'd definately be interested in what you have to share for the encryption part. I just downloaded tor and signed up for tormail. Thanks!

I'll wait to use anything until you add more:)
 
MR. BMJ said:
MS, i'd definately be interested in what you have to share for the encryption part. I just downloaded tor and signed up for tormail. Thanks!

I'll wait to use anything until you add more:)
Click to expand...

Drop me a line at my TorMail address: [email protected].

I've got the first draft of my encryption tutorial ready for your perusal.
Comments, criticisms, bouquets, brickbats, all welcome.
 
Message from the TorMail Admin

Message from the TorMail Admin

20 April 2012 - TorMail.net Domain Problems - tormail.net is now tormail.org

Early this morning, April 20, our domain registrar nic.ru suspended the domain tormail.net.

The reason they gave is because they require us to submit ID documents to them, apostilized and certified by the Russian Embassy.

We are unable to do this to protect our own identity, and also this request is very unusual and suspicious.

They have further refused to unlock the domain and allow us to transfer it to a different registrar.

We have filed a complaint with ICANN as per the domain transfer rules, they are not allowed to do this.

As it is the weekend, we probably wont get a response until next week, and even to transfer a domain normally takes about a week to be completed.
For this reason, at the earliest we can hope for is to have the domain back within two weeks.

It is possible the domain is gone for good and it may not be possible to get it back.

Up until two months ago, the domain was registered with a USA company, Moniker domains.

They were great and we had no problems with them, but with the recent domain seizures we decided to move the domain offshore.

It appears this was a big mistake, the Russian providers are much worse!

The chances of getting the domain back does not look good, and even if we get it back it will take a long time.

For that reason we have registered a new domain name tormail.org and will use that one to continue the service.

If we do get the tormail.net domain back, we will change back to using that one.

Every user who had a @tormail.net address now has the same address @tormail.org

You may continue to use the @tormail.net addresses on the Tor Mail website, but they will not work with external services.

You should quickly change the email addresses at any services you are using.

If we get the tormail.net domain back, both addresses will be able to reach you.

If you are using our webmail service, (squirrelmail or roundcube) no changes are necessary.

If you are using thunderbird or other SMTP software, you will need to change the "From" address to your new tormail.org address or you will be unable to send mail.

Sorry for the inconvenience, but we were taken by surprise by this and had no time to avoid it.

Admin.
 
Whistleblower: The NSA is Lying -- The U.S. Government Has Copies of Most of Your Ema

Whistleblower: The NSA is Lying -- The U.S. Government Has Copies of Most of Your Ema

Democracy Now! / By Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzalez
Whistleblower: The NSA is Lying -- The U.S. Government Has Copies of Most of Your Emails

NSA whistleblower William Binney believes domestic surveillance has become more expansive under President Obama than President George W. Bush.
April 20, 2012


Editor's note: The following is a transcript of a Democracy Now! 4-part series on America's growing surveillance state.

National Security Agency whistleblower William Binney reveals he believes domestic surveillance has become more expansive under President Obama than President George W. Bush. He estimates the NSA has assembled 20 trillion "transactions" ? phone calls, emails and other forms of data ? from Americans. This likely includes copies of almost all of the emails sent and received from most people living in the United States. Binney talks about Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and challenges NSA Director Keith Alexander?s assertion that the NSA is not intercepting information about U.S. citizens.This interview is part of a 4-part special. Click here to see segment 1, 2, and 4.

(Editor's note: Also interviewed are Laura Poitras, the Academy Award-nominated filmmaker, and Jacob Appelbaum, a computer security researcher who has volunteered with WikiLeaks. Both Poitras and Appelbaum have been repeatedly detained and interrogated by federal agents when entering the United States. Their laptops, cameras and cell phones have been seized, and presumably their data has been copied.)

JUAN GONZALEZ: Well, I wanted to ask William Binney about this issue. When it comes to snail mail, the old postal system, it?s very tough for the government to intercept mail, except in times of war, particular situations. When it comes to phone conversations, land phone conversations, you need a warrant to be able to intercept phone conversations. But what about email, and what about the communication now that is really the dominant form that not only Americans, but many people around the world communicate? What are the restrictions on the government in terms of email?

WILLIAM BINNEY: Well, after some of the laws they passed, like thePATRIOT Act and their secret interpretation of Section 215, which is?my view, of course, is same as Tom Drake?s, is that that gives them license to take all the commercially held data about us, which is exceedingly dangerous, because if you take that and put it into forms of graphing, which is building relationships or social networks for everybody, and then you watch it over time, you can build up knowledge about everyone in the country. And having that knowledge then allows them the ability to concoct all kinds of charges, if they want to target you. Like in my case, they fabricated several charges and attempted to indict us on them. Fortunately, we were able to produce evidence that would make them look very silly in court, so they didn?t do it. In fact, it was?I was basically assembling evidence of malicious prosecution, which was a countercharge to them. So...

AMY GOODMAN: Do you believe all emails, the government has copies of, in the United States?

WILLIAM BINNEY: I would think?I believe they have most of them, yes.

AMY GOODMAN: And you?re speaking from a position where you would know, considering your position in the National Security Agency.

WILLIAM BINNEY: Right. All they would have to do is put various Narus devices at various points along the network, at choke points or convergent points, where the network converges, and they could basically take down and have copies of most everything on the network.

AMY GOODMAN: Jacob, your email?

JACOB APPELBAUM: Well, I selectively chose to use certain public services, like Sonic.net and Gmail, and I specifically did that so as to serve as a warning to other people. I didn?t use it for anything interesting, never once emailed Julian, for example, from those accounts. But the U.S. government again asserted in those cases, according to the Wall Street Journal, which is one way to find out about what?s going on with you?they asserted that they have the right to all that metadata. And it is possible?on Monday, I had a little interaction with the FBI, where they sort of hinted that maybe there might be a national security letter for one of my email accounts, which is also hosted by Google, specifically because I want to serve as a canary in a coal mine for other people.

AMY GOODMAN: A national security letter?it?s believed the government has given out hundreds of thousands of those.

JACOB APPELBAUM: Yeah.

AMY GOODMAN: I have also written about NSLs. But if you get one, you are not allowed to talk about it, on pain of something like up to five years in prison, even to mention that you were handed a national security letter that said turn something over.

JACOB APPELBAUM: Yeah. That was the case of Nick Merrill, for example, who?s a brave American, who essentially fought and won the NSL that was handed down to him.

AMY GOODMAN: And the librarians of Connecticut?

JACOB APPELBAUM: Yes.

AMY GOODMAN: ?who were taking on the USA PATRIOT Act and didn?t want to give information over about patrons in the library that the FBIwanted to get information on.

JACOB APPELBAUM: Right, absolutely. So, an NSL, what?s specifically scary about it is that all that is required is for an FBI agent to assert that they need one, and that?s it. And you don?t have a chance to have judicial review, because you aren?t the one served. Your service provider will be served. And they can?t tell you, so you don?t get your day in court.

AMY GOODMAN: Laura, can you set up this clip that we have?

LAURA POITRAS: Yes, actually, this is what Jake was alluding to. On Monday, there was a panel at the Open Society Institute. And Jake?and there was a deputy general counsel of the FBI who was present, and Jake had the opportunity to question her about national security letters.

JACOB APPELBAUM: Are you including national security letters in your comment about believing that there is judicial oversight with the FBI?s actions?

FBI DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL: National security letters and administrative subpoenas have the ability to have judicial oversight, yes.

JACOB APPELBAUM: How many of those actually do have judicial oversight, in percentage?

FBI DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL: What do you mean by that? How many have?

JACOB APPELBAUM: I mean, every time you get a national security letter, you have to go to a judge? Or?

FBI DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL: No, as you well know, national security letters, just like administrative subpoenas, you don?t have to go to a judge. The statute does allow for the person on whom those are served to seek judicial review. And people have done so.

JACOB APPELBAUM: And in the case of the third parties, such as, say, the 2703(d) orders that were served on my ? according to the Wall Street Journal ? my Gmail account, my Twitter account, and my internet service provider account, the third parties were prohibited from telling me about it, so how am I supposed to go to a judge, if the third party is gagged from telling me that I?m targeted by you?

FBI DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL: There are times when we have to have those things in place. So, at some point, obviously, you became aware. So at some point, the person does become aware. But yes, the statute does allow us to do that. The statute allows us.

AMY GOODMAN: Now, Jacob, explain who she was again.

JACOB APPELBAUM: So, my understanding is that she?s the deputy general counsel of the FBI.

AMY GOODMAN: And the significance of what she has just said?

JACOB APPELBAUM: Essentially, what she says is, "We are just and righteous because you get judicial review. But there are some cases where you don?t, and we are still just and righteous. And you should trust us, because COINTELPRO will never happen again." That?s what I heard from that. And, in fact, later, someone asked about COINTELPRO and said, "How can we" ?

AMY GOODMAN: The counterintelligence program that targeted so many dissidents in the 1970s.

JACOB APPELBAUM: Yeah. Tried to get Martin Luther King Jr. to kill himself, for example. The FBI wrote him a letter and encouraged him to commit suicide. So for her to suggest that it is just and right and that we should always trust them sort of overlooks the historical problems with doing exactly that for any people in a position of power, with no judicial oversight.

JUAN GONZALEZ: William Binney, what about the companies that are approached by the government to participate or facilitate the surveillance? Your sense of the degree of opposition that they?re mounting, if at all? And also, has there been any kind of qualitative change since the Obama administration came in versus what the Bush administration was practicing?

WILLIAM BINNEY: Well, first of all, I don?t think any of them opposed it in any way. I mean, they were approached to saying, "You?ll be patriotic if you support us." So I think they saluted and said, "Yes, sir," and supported them, because they were told it was legal, too. And then, of course, they had to be given retroactive immunity for the crimes they were committing. So?

JUAN GONZALEZ: Approved by President Obama.

WILLIAM BINNEY: And President Bush, yeah. It started with Bush, yeah.

JUAN GONZALEZ: And the differences in the administrations?

WILLIAM BINNEY: Actually, I think the surveillance has increased. In fact, I would suggest that they?ve assembled on the order of 20 trillion transactions about U.S. citizens with other U.S. citizens.

AMY GOODMAN: How many?

WILLIAM BINNEY: Twenty trillion.

AMY GOODMAN: And you?re saying that this surveillance has increased? Not only the?

WILLIAM BINNEY: Yes.

AMY GOODMAN: ?targeting of whistleblowers, like your colleagues, like people like Tom Drake, who are actually indicted under the Obama administration?

WILLIAM BINNEY: Right.

AMY GOODMAN: ?more times?the number of people who have been indicted are more than all presidents combined in the past.

WILLIAM BINNEY: Right. And I think it?s to silence what?s going on. But the point is, the data that?s being assembled is about everybody. And from that data, then they can target anyone they want.

AMY GOODMAN: Bill Binney, talk about Bluffdale, Utah. What is being built there?

WILLIAM BINNEY: Well, a very large storage device, basically, for remote interrogation and remote processing. That?s the way I view that. Because there?s not enough people there to actually work the data there, so it?s being worked somewhere else.

AMY GOODMAN: Where do you get the number 20 trillion?

WILLIAM BINNEY: Just by the numbers of telecoms, it appears to me, from the questions that CNET posed to them in 2006, and they published the names and how?what the responses were. I looked at that and said that anybody that equivocated was participating, and then estimated from that the numbers of transactions. That, by the way, estimate only was involving phone calls and emails. It didn?t involve any queries on the net or any assembles?other?any financial transactions or credit card stuff, if they?re assembling that. I do not know that, OK.

JUAN GONZALEZ: And the original?the original allegations that you made, in terms of the crimes being committed under the Bush administration in terms of the rights of American citizens, could you detail those?

WILLIAM BINNEY: Well, I made that?I reported the crime when I was raided in 2007. And it was that Bush and Cheney and Hayden and Tenet conspired to subvert the Constitution and violate various laws of the?that exist in the statute at the time, and here?s how they did it. And I was reporting this to the FBI on my back porch during the raid. And I went through Stellar Wind and told them what it did and what the information it was using and how they were spying on?or assembling data to be able to spy on any American.

AMY GOODMAN: I want to go to a clip of Congress Member Hank Johnson?he?s the Georgia Democrat?questioning National Security Administration director, General Keith Alexander, last month, asking him whether the NSAspies on U.S. citizens.

REP. HANK JOHNSON: Does the NSA routinely intercept American citizens? emails?

GEN. KEITH ALEXANDER: No.

REP. HANK JOHNSON: Does the NSA intercept Americans? cell phone conversations?

GEN. KEITH ALEXANDER: No.

REP. HANK JOHNSON: Google searches?

GEN. KEITH ALEXANDER: No.

REP. HANK JOHNSON: Text messages?

GEN. KEITH ALEXANDER: No.

REP. HANK JOHNSON: Amazon.com orders?

GEN. KEITH ALEXANDER: No.

REP. HANK JOHNSON: Bank records?

GEN. KEITH ALEXANDER: No.

REP. HANK JOHNSON: What judicial consent is required for NSAto intercept communications and information involving American citizens?

GEN. KEITH ALEXANDER: Within the United States, that would be the FBI lead. If it was a foreign actor in the United States, theFBI would still have the lead and could work that with NSA or other intelligence agencies, as authorized. But to conduct that kind of collection in the United States, it would have to go through a court order, and the court would have to authorize it. We are not authorized to do it, nor do we do it.

AMY GOODMAN: That was General Keith Alexander, the NSA director, being questioned by Democratic Congress Member Hank Johnson. Bill Binney, he?s the head of your agency, of the NSA. Explain what he?s saying?what he?s not saying, as well.

WILLIAM BINNEY: Well, I think it?s?part of it is a term, how you use the term "intercept," as to whether or not what they?re saying is, "We aren?t actually looking at it, but we have it," you know, or whether or not they?re actually collecting it and storing it somewhere.

JUAN GONZALEZ: So the mistake of the congressman was not to ask, "Are you collecting information?"

WILLIAM BINNEY: Well, he also said things like, "We don?t collect" ? or, "We don?t collect against U.S. citizens unless we have a warrant." And then, at the same time, he said that we don?t?at the same interview, he said, "We don?t have the capability to collect inside this country." Well, those are kind of contradictory.

AMY GOODMAN: Is he lying? Is General Keith Alexander lying?

WILLIAM BINNEY: I wouldn?t?you know, the point is how you split the words. I wouldn?t say "lying." It?s a kind of avoiding the issue.

AMY GOODMAN: Jacob Appelbaum, how does this relate to you? And how powerful is General Keith Alexander?

JACOB APPELBAUM: I was saying to Bill that I think he?s probably the most powerful person in the world, in the sense that?

AMY GOODMAN: More powerful than President Obama?

JACOB APPELBAUM: Well, sure. I mean, if he controls the information that arrives on Obama?s desk, and Obama makes decisions based on the things on his desk, what decisions can he make, if?except the decisions presented to him by the people he trusts? And when the people he trusts are the military, the military makes the decisions, then the civilian government is not actually in power.

AMY GOODMAN: Bill Binney, you?re nodding your head.

WILLIAM BINNEY: Yes. I mean, well, for example, their responsibility is to interpret what they have and report up echelon. So, I mean, that?s the responsibility of all the intelligence agencies. So, they basically filter the information to what they believe is important, which is what they should do, because, you know, they?re occupying?it takes time for leaders to review material to make decisions. So they have to boil it down as best they can. So it?s a function of their processing, but it is important that they do it correctly to make sure the information that gets there is correct and complete as it can.

AMY GOODMAN: Is General Alexander more powerful than President Obama?

WILLIAM BINNEY: In the sense of making?of presenting information for decision making, sure.

JUAN GONZALEZ: And Laura, the impact on journalists, who have to go through what you go?you?ve gone through the last few years, just to be able to report what?s going on with our government? The chilling effect that this has on?maybe not on you, but on many other journalists?

LAURA POITRAS: Sure. I mean, I feel like I can?t talk about the work that I do in my home, in my place of work, on my telephone, and sometimes in my country. So the chilling effect is huge. It?s enormous.

AMY GOODMAN: You keep your computers and telephones away from conversations you?re having in a room?

LAURA POITRAS: Yeah. When we had a meeting with you, remember, we told you?we kicked all your cell phones and all your computers out of the room.

AMY GOODMAN: You un?the wired phone, you unwired.

LAURA POITRAS: Yeah.

AMY GOODMAN: My cell phone, you didn?t allow me to have it in the room. And you made sure there were no computers in the room.

LAURA POITRAS: Right.

AMY GOODMAN: Why?

LAURA POITRAS: Because we wanted?well, we wanted to talk about?because we were bringing?we were bringing William to New York. And?

AMY GOODMAN: We have to leave it there, but we?re going to go online right now at democracynow.org. We?re going to continue this conversation with Bill Binney of the NSA, formerly with NSA; Laura Poitras and Jacob Appelbaum.

This interview is part of a 4-part special. Click here to see segment 1, 2, and4.

Amy Goodman is the host of the nationally syndicated radio news program, Democracy Now!.
Juan Gonzalez is the co-host of the nationally syndicated radio news program, Democracy Now!.

http://www.alternet.org/story/15508...has_copies_of_most_of_your_emails?page=entire
 
I sign up to countermail and as soon as I'm due to pay (1 month late) I drop it and sign up with another account. This way I get a good encrypted email account for free.
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I was getting ready to say Proton mail but I see Basskiller has already suggested that one. I think it's great, it does have a short waiting list and I've heard of people waiting a month but I had an account in three days. It also requires an additional password to decrypt your account AFTER you login w your username and password and not even they have your decryption password so if you ever forget that password you'd literally have to create a whole new account there are no recovery options. I like that part because no matter how much they are pressed they could give up login info but couldn't get passed the decryption page and requires you to re-enter the decryption every couple of hours.
 
Even if you use a VPN service to mask your IP, the service provider may still provide logs to LE. All US communications have been required to have provisions for LE backdoor access since the 90s. If you really want to be safe, get a laptop, buy a cup of coffee somewhere to get the wifi code and then check email. It doesn't hurt to keep your mailboxes or system clean either.
 
Magnesium said:
Even if you use a VPN service to mask your IP, the service provider may still provide logs to LE. All US communications have been required to have provisions for LE backdoor access since the 90s. If you really want to be safe, get a laptop, buy a cup of coffee somewhere to get the wifi code and then check email. It doesn't hurt to keep your mailboxes or system clean either.
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Yeah....ever since the shady way silk road went down and the BS conviction they got...combined with all the arrests that continue to grow I dont think there is any true way to stay anonymous

It sucks because all of this is being done to stop terrorism and child pornography...but it also opens the door to best other people when they deem it necessary
 
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